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1 You either see the duck or the rabbit. Attention flickers from one perceptual matrix to
the other, without any possible synthesis between the two, in a way that resembles the
incongruous effects produced by a verbal double entendre or indeed any other kind of
humorous device. The point I shall be discussing in this paper is whether and to what
extent  Umberto Eco’s  Semiotics  –  a  lifelong attempt to combine “the devil  and holy
water,” as he once jokingly defined Structuralism and Pragmatism – maintains the same
unstable  and  oscillatory  equilibrium  between  conflicting  matrices  that  is  proper  to
ambiguous figures and humorous thinking.  To do so I  shall  summon a concept  that,
though never an item of  Eco’s  own philosophical  toolbox,  provides a suitable key to
access his peculiar patterns of thought.
Bisociation: “the perceiving of a situation or idea, L, in two self-consistent but habitually
incompatible frames of reference, M
1
 and M
2. The event L, in which the two intersect, is
made to vibrate simultaneously on two different wavelengths, as it were. While this
unusual  situation  lasts,  L  is  not  merely  linked  to  one  associative  context,  but
bisociated with two.” (Koestler 1964: 35; original emphasis)
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Figure 1: Bisociation (Koestler 1964: 35)
2 In  his  study  on  The  Act  of  Creation,  Arthur  Koestler  famously  analysed  the  common
mechanism underlying  three  mental  activities  that,  according  to  him,  epitomize  the
heights of creative thought:  Humour, Scientific Discovery and Poetic Invention. In all
three  the  spark  of  creativity  is  generated  by  the  surprising  encounter  of  two “self-
consistent but habitually incompatible frames of reference, M1 and M2” that intersect in a
given point (L). In the rabbit-duck example, L coincides with the graphic marks that may
be interpreted both as rabbit attributes (say the ears) and as duck attributes (the beak)
without, however, being interpretable simultaneously as both. In scientific discovery, the
point of junction corresponds with a familiar element (say the branch of a tree that a
chimp unthinkingly chews on) that may be reframed in terms of a different pattern of
behaviour (ripped from the tree, it could become an instrument with which to reach a
distant banana). In poetic invention L is what some semiologists would call an “isotopic
connector,” for example a polysemic word that may trigger a variety of semantic frames.
3 Although each bisociated matrix is per se compatible with L,  attempts at condensing
them in a single self-consistent super-matrix are hindered by the habit of considering
them as reciprocally unrelated. Yet the interpreter itches for some form of amalgam or
unitary composition: the elegant way M1 and M2 both fit in L suggests that it might be
possible to do so. Bisociation lasts for as long as the synthesis is prefigured but not yet
reached. Like Tzvetan Todorov’s effet fantastique (Todorov 1970) its interval is that of a
state  of  hesitation.  What  determines  the difference between Scientific  Discovery and
Humour (the case of Poetic Invention is more difficult to pin down as it shares traits of
both domains) is whether or not it is indeed possible to retrieve or construct a consistent
juncture  of  the  apparently  unrelated  frames:  Eureka! and  laughter  are  alternative
outcomes of the same interpretive conundrum.1 
4 The manifold ways in which the concept of bisociation (though never referred to as such)
appears in Eco’s academic and literary corpus is so striking that we could safely consider
it as one of the most prominent features of his mode of thinking, as well as one of his
favourite objects of study. To start with, his texts are ridden with examples of word-play,
mots  d’esprit,  nonsense  rhymes,  self-voiding  texts,  optical  illusions,  ambiguous  and
impossible figures such as Penrose’s devil’s fork, analysed by Merrell  (1981),  that Eco
(1990) uses to exemplify the concept of impossible possible worlds: a perfect case of clash
between incompatible matrices. Not to mention his passion for duck-billed platypuses,
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unicorns,  hypatias and other hybrid creatures that populate his imaginary landscape.
Creative metaphors, portmanteau words and mixed idioms belong to more or less the
same realm of open possibilities, serendipitous encounters and unexpected short-circuits
between distant frames. His obvious attraction for perceptual, linguistic and intellectual
juxtapositions is also testified by the attention he devotes to Abduction as a key-concept
of  interpretive  Semiotics,  where  –  following  Peirce  –  he  puts  the  emphasis  on  the
interpreter’s  ability  to  bring  together  hitherto  unrelated  segments  (the  farther  the
better) of the Global Encyclopaedia. An ability that Eco himself applies to his numerous
analyses of various communicative artefacts, from avant-garde art to popular literature,
where the gist of his method often coincides with an unexpected encounter of conceptual
frames (hence his famed capacity to mingle high- and lowbrow culture in all the domains
of his multi-faceted activity). Finally, bisociation plays an important role in the creation
of some of Eco’s most innovative theoretical contributions – starting from the concept of
Encyclopaedia, possibly at the very core of his semiotic theory – insofar as they almost
invariably result from a graft between separate and sometimes conflicting philosophical
paradigms. 
5 In the next few paragraphs I shall examine some of these implants, in a bid to show how,
in a Structuralist framework such as the one that hegemonized the semiotic scene in the
Sixties and Seventies,  Pragmatism plays the part of the second, colliding matrix that
sparks off Eco’s bisociations. For each, the question will be whether the clash produces
self-consistent theoretical amalgams, or whether some degree of contradiction inevitably
remains  to  generate  the abovementioned duck-rabbit  effect.  I  shall  then analyse  the
heuristic role that such (for the time being hypothetical) residual incongruities play in a
Semiotic theory that thrives on the self-voiding logic of humorous short-circuits.
 
2. Sign Functions and Semiosis
6 Judging from the bibliographical references in his published essays, Eco’s first encounter
with Peirce  dates  back  to  sometime  around  the  late  1960s/early  1970s,  between  La
struttura assente (1968), where Peirce’s name does not yet appear, and Segno (1973), which
includes the Collected Papers in the bibliography. Possibly suggested by Roman Jakobson’s
1953  puzzling  definition  of  Peirce  as  “one  of  the  greatest  pioneers  of  structuralist
linguistic analysis” (now in Jakobson 1963 [1992: 7]), the idea that Peirce’s Pragmati(ci)sm
may be considered as the other face of Saussurean Linguistics plays a crucial role in Eco’s
attempt at formulating “a Unified Semiotic Theory of Signs” (Eco 1973: 20) suitable for
the study of both linguistic and nonlinguistic (iconic, indexical, natural…) signs and sign
systems. 
7 The intersecting point (L) between the two self-sufficient Semiotic paradigms is clearly
the very term Sign, or semeion, which both Peirce and Saussure choose as the defining
element of their new disciplinary fields. But the problems arise as soon as the common
link is intentionally and extensionally defined: though somehow similar, the Peircean and
Saussurean concepts of Sign are by no means identical, nor do the phenomena they refer
to overlap completely. The first is triadic, inferential, mental and exceedingly inclusive,
while  the  second  is  dyadic,  conventional,  rigorously  linguistic  and  of  very  limited
extension  if  compared  to  its  pragmatist  counterpart.  How  to  integrate  the  two
perspectives – what to select in each, what to leave out, and how to translate one in terms
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of the other – is the first scientific challenge that Eco, along with other semiologists who
agree with his comprehensive approach, is faced with.
8 Right from Segno (and through A Theory in Semiotics, The Role of the Reader, Semiotics and
Philosophy of  Language,  The Limits of  Interpretation,  down to Kant and the Platypus)  Eco’s
tendency is to consider Peirce’s definitions as the most satisfactory descriptions of the
semiotic device, in line with a longstanding philosophical tradition that dates back to
Aristotle, the Stoics and St. Augustin, as well as with the everyday uses of the word (Sign
as symptom, clue, footprint, omen…). Hence his attempts to englobe the linguistic sign
(roughly Aristotle’s and Peirce’s Symbol) in a wider picture, at first through a series of
bold approximations (see diagram below), then by alternatively (i) taming or watering
down some of the most irreducible characteristics of Peirce’s Sign/Interpretant/Object
triad that prevent it from being trimmed down to Saussure’s Signifiant/Signifié,2 or by (ii)
loosening the structuralist prerequisite of a tight pre-existing convention by admitting
cases of radical (= codeless) interpretation in the realm of semiotics.3
 
Figure 2: The Semiotic Triangle (Eco 1973: 26)
9 As the clash between structuralism and pragmatism becomes more acute in Eco’s hybrid
theory, the notion of Sign is replaced by two different and seemingly opposite concepts.
The first, which derives from the ultra-structuralist approach embodied, more than by
Saussure’s Cours, by Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena (1943), dissolves the concept of Sign in the
myriad of oppositional relations that make up the two planes of language, Expression and
Content, in an overall algebraic relation between the elements of the sign-function. From
a strictly formal and immanent point of view, the entity we normally call Sign is but “the
manifest and recognizable end of a net of aggregations and disintegrations constantly
open to further combinations. The linguistic sign is not a unit of the system of
signification; it is, rather, a detectable unit in the process of communication.” (Eco 1986:
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21).  And  if  –  as  Hjemslev  would  have  us  believe  –  any  process  of  communication
presupposes a system of signification (a code or a language),  the sum total  of  whose
possible combinations is virtually included in the folds of its structure, it follows that the
contingent  and  provisional  manifestations  of  such  an  abstract  system  become
supernumerary  entities  within  a  rigorous  theory  that  aims  at  explaining  how  any
(existing or possible) language works.
10 At the same time, Eco follows Peirce’s lead by absorbing the static notion of Sign in the
incessant  flow  of  semiosis  that  constitutes  the  very  essence  of  thought  in  action.
According to the criterion of interpretability at the core of the pragmatist paradigm, “a
sign is only a sign in actu by virtue of its receiving an interpretation, that is, by virtue of
its determining another sign of the same object. This is as true of mental judgments as it
is of external signs.” (CP 5.569; original emphasis). And since an interpretation – be it
mental or externally expressed – is itself a sign in progress, it will in turn trigger another
interpretation (an uttered sentence, a silent thought, or indeed any other internal or
external representation referring to the same Object as related to the original Sign), and
so on, in a potentially endless string of Sign/Interpretations (= Interpretants) whose sum
total coincides with the totality of an individual’s mental existence (“the symphony of our
intellectual life,” CP 5.397). 
11 As a cognitive element, the Peircean Sign is therefore the node or intersection point of a
bundle of synapses – interpretive habits or Interpretants – that link up to other nodes,
and so forth, in an open-ended process that may remind us of a (more or less disciplined)
stream of consciousness, while maintaining a connection with the Object (“something
else”) that sparked off the previous links in the chain of Interpretants. Sometimes these
Interpretants assume the form of perceivable behaviours (external signs such as somatic
expressions, gestures or linguistic utterances) which may in turn become the focus of
other interpreters’ semiosic activities. Although Peirce is not particularly interested in
the communicative aspects of semiosis, within his framework there is nothing to prevent
an  individual  from  expressing  the  results  of  her musements  and  inquiries  through
external signs, thus sharing them with other members of the interpretive community.
Culture begins when the Interpretants are made public.
12 Here is where Eco’s bisociations light up. Once a certain connection between Signs is
registered and made public, it acquires a cultural status that differentiates it from all
other private chains of Interpretants. If the shared connections prove to be collectively
advantageous under some respect or capacity – if they contribute to making the world a
more intelligible or predictable place, if they enable people to perform certain tasks, if
they promote social cohesion, etc. – they become more and more deeply engrained in the
interpretive  habits  of  that  specific  community.  This  is  how  an  originally audacious
hypothesis may undergo a process of standardization that little by little turns it into a
semi-automatic interpretive habit shared by different members of the community.4 It is
also how a given behaviour (say an angry expression combined with a raised fist) may
lose its original iconicity and become progressively stylized, insofar as the interpretations
it triggers depend less and less on the inferential acumen of the single receivers and more
on the overcoded Interpretants that the Sign is publicly associated with.5
13 By focusing entirely on this category of public Interpretants,  Eco brings his Semiotic
research  back  on  the  culturalistic  tracks  that  were  proper  to  Structural  Linguistics.
Whatever happens in the mind of a single interpreter, the only aspects of her cognitive
activity that are semiotically relevant are those that could be made accessible to other
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members of the cultural community, or even to members of other communities, provided
some form of cultural exchange between the two is underway. In any case, what is left out
of the semiotic field are the idiosyncratic connections that only the single interpreter
would be able to activate on the exclusive grounds of her private experiences (unless, of
course, such experiences were made public through the production of external signs). 
14 In this perspective, Saussure’s arbitrary relation between the two faces of a sign-function
could be reframed in terms of an overcoded interpretation whose cultural crystallization
has invested the relation between the Interpretant and its Sign with the status of an
almost biconditional rule (not just “if fire, then smoke” but also “if smoke, then [most
probably]  fire”).  The  cumulative  effect  of  this  over-codification is  a  relation of  near
equivalence (fire ≅ smoke) whose application requires only a minimal inferential effort
on the interpreter’s part. In other words, near equivalence is a specific form of semi-
mechanical, almost compulsory inference. And even in the relatively few cases in which
the equivalence is established a priori, through a convention stricto sensu rather than a
progressive  sedimentation  of  successful  interpretive  habits6 (i.e.,  when  a  linguistic
institution decrees, by means of a metasemiotic instruction, “from now on let x ≡ y”; for
example  let  three  blows  of  the  whistle ≡  end  of  match),  the  application  of  such  a
conventional rule is never totally automatic inasmuch as it is context-sensitive and needs
to be fine-tuned to the specific circumstances in which the rule is summoned.7
 
3. Dictionary and Encyclopaedia
15 Having agreed to the inferential (triadic) nature of all semiotic activity,8 Eco goes back to
the  structuralist  idea  that  a  system  of  signification  virtually  entails  all  its  possible
communicative  outcomes.  A  strong  advocate  of  the  combinatory  logic  of cultural
production (“Let no one say that I have said nothing new: the arrangement of the subject
is new,” Eco 1976),9 he is fascinated by all historical attempts – no matter how abortive –
to put into practice the principles underlying the Lullian Ars Magna (1305). Just like Lully’s
rotating discs produced hundreds of permutations on the basis of a limited number of
combinatory units, other more or less utopic efforts to crack the ultimate codes of human
sign- and sense-production are based on the search of a handful of primary elements
whose possible arrangements or derivations produce a vertiginous quantity of complex
meanings.  Leaving  aside  the  gallery  of  heroic  failures  collected  by  Eco  in  his  1997
monograph on the search of the perfect language, the attempts he is most interested in
are  Dictionary-based  semantic  models  such  as  Porphyry’s  tree,  Katz  and  Fodor’s
generative semantics (1963) and – especially – Hjelmslev’s glossematics (1943). 
16 Dictionary semantic models share the common belief that the incalculable number of
existing and/or conceivable sentence- and word-meanings in any given language may be
boiled down to a closed set of defining traits. Be they universal categories, innate ideas,
essential  properties,  semantic  markers  or  figurae,  the  basic  quality  of  such allegedly
primary elements is their capacity to generate more complex linguistic or conceptual
contents  by way of  sheer  combination.  No surplus  of  meaning is  attributable  to  the
accidental information that comes from experiences of the outside world (you don’t need
to have seen a cow to grasp the linguistic meaning of the word “cow”): a set of self-
sufficient recursive rules applied to the primary elements of a closed system allows for
the generation of a multitude of Content Units. Which means that all possible Content
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Units are virtually contained in the immanent grammar or matrix that generates them:
the Code of all codes, no less. 
17 In accordance with this line of reasoning Hjelmslev believes that, within the structure of
any given language,  it  is  possible to “analyse the entities that enter the unrestricted
inventories purely into entities that enter the restricted inventories” (Hjelmslev 1943:
71). Granted that for every natural language the huge variety of articulated expressions
may be reduced to a manageable repertoire of twenty or thirty phonemes whose possible
combinations  unleash  the  immense  expressive  power  of  that  language,  it  should  be
possible to apply the same recursively analytical procedure to the other linguistic plane
in order to identify the ultimate building blocks of all possible meanings. The advantage
offered by Dictionary models is that they suggest “a sort of molecular landscape in which
what we are accustomed to recognize as everyday forms turn out to be the result of
transitory chemical aggregations and so-called ‘things’ are only the surface appearance
assumed by an underlying network of more elementary units” (Eco 1976: 49): a perfect
realization of the wildest Structuralist dream. The disadvantage is that they don’t work.
18 Eco  (1976  and  1986)  spends  much  time  and  energy  demonstrating  their  logical  and
epistemological  untenability.  More  than  strictly  necessary,  as  a  matter  of  fact,
considering the immediately persuasive arguments with which it is possible to prove that
there are no semantic equivalents of phonemes, that the two planes of language are not
isomorphous, and that even if “female bovine” were a satisfactory definition of “cow”
(which it is not), there would be no reason to believe that “female” + “bovine” belong to a
more restricted inventory than the one hosting the allegedly more complex Content Unit
“cow.” Yet Eco delves deep into the combinatory logic of Dictionary semantics before
dismissing  it  as  defective.  He  explains  the  details  of  each  theory  with  scrupulous
attention, as if complying with its method, absorbing its rationale and hoping that the
system will work after all. Only when the theory betrays its most evident flaws does he
decree its failure to fulfil the expectations it created. The disproportionate efforts Eco
devotes to his Anti-Porphyry, Anti-Katz and Fodor and Anti-Hjelmslev polemics suggest
that these orderly models exert an intellectual appeal on him that goes beyond the mere
mechanism of refutation. 
19 Neither is  it  enough to attribute Eco’s  passion for defectively airtight systems to his
thomistic background, on the one hand, or to his acquired distrust towards all forms of
“strong thought,” on the other. Beyond or beneath the biographical explanations lies the
author’s typically bisociated pattern of thinking. In a well-told joke, the punchline comes
after a longwinded preparatory phase in which the listener is made to feel comfortable
with the assumptions of an apparently self-consistent (and often self-assertive) frame.
Likewise, Eco builds up familiarity and expectations regarding Porphyry’s Tree and its
derived models so that, when the reader is finally caught up in the paradigm’s logic, the
collision with an incompatible  counter-logic  may release the humorous effects  of  an
overwhelming contradiction.
20 What, then, is the second frame whose sudden impact opens a breach in the sealed logic
of Dictionary semantics? Whenever Eco wants to explode the pretentions of an all-too-
orderly sense structure, he confronts it with the worldview of a candid layperson who
relies on sensible experience as the ultimate source of truth-judgements. A good example
may be found in Kant and the Platypus (“Tiny Tim’s Story,” Eco 1999: 186-91), where a five-
year old’s description of water – something that you put your hands under when you wash them
with soap, that is wet and has no shape but goes around all over the place, that is in rivers and
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bathtubs, etc. – pulls the rug under the analytical definition of water as transparent liquid.
The  child’s  radical  empiricism  collides  with  the  adult’s  rationalist  approach.  As  if
puncturing an overinflated balloon,  it  voids  the  dream of  a  perfect  taxonomy of  its
ontological  raison  d’être.  If  the  way  we  normally  think  resembles  Tiny  Tim’s  (who
associates each word with an open list of first-hand experiences),  then the grandiose
masterplan of splitting linguistic meanings down to their primary elements (and then
sorting them in a tidy treelike structure) suffers from a cultural fallacy that we may
legitimately laugh about, possibly because it says more about our psychological need for
closure and order than about  the way things really are and work.  Closed,  organized
systems vs. Open, chaotic experiences: this is the first bisociation that Eco calls into play
when introducing the concept of Encyclopaedia.
21 The next step – which differentiates a purely humorous device from an act of scientific
discovery –  consists  in trying to merge the two divergent frames into one.  The link
between Openness and Closeness is provided by the concept of Interpretant. Like
Koestler’s resourceful chimp, Eco rips the Interpretant – as it were – from the Peircean
jungle and grafts it onto structuralist componential analysis, in a bid to infuse life in the
sterile  denotative  and  connotative  markers  through which  Dictionary  models  fail  to
break down the meaning of words in their simpler components. Insofar as they always
open up the  Sign to  something new,  Interpretants  introduce  an element  of  creative
happenstance in the course of semiosis, while recouping a vital connection between Signs
and the outside world. At the same time, however, they may be thought of as relatively
stable nodes of (albeit feebly) structured systems, considering the overcoded nature of
the semiotic habits they tend to embody. In other words, Tiny Tim’s definitions of water
are, yes, idiosyncratic, unstable and disorganized, as you would expect from a child whose
knowledge of the world is still sufficiently disentangled from the conditioning of social
institutions. But the adult’s remarks and questions – Maybe it’s that red thing in the stove
that burns? Is it damp like fruit? So it’s not a solid thing like bread… And if it’s not solid, what is it?
etc. – nudge his private Interpretants towards culturally beaten paths, so that little by
little he gets used to opposing water to fire, dampness to wetness, liquids to solids, and so
on. By conforming to other people’s expectations Tim will eventually become a fully-
fledged member of his linguistic and interpretive (= cultural) community.
22 Being a member of a cultural community means knowing how to trigger more or less the
same  Interpretants  as  most  other  members  presumably  would  in  the  same  given
circumstances. A standardised network of interpretive habits – Eco (2014) refers to it as
the  Average  Encyclopaedia  –  guarantees  a  certain  degree  of  automaticity  in
communicative  exchanges,  with  the  obvious  adaptive  advantage  of  minimizing
misunderstandings within the group. And since the impulse to categorize seems to be
part  and  parcel  of  human nature,  the  common Interpretants  tend  to  cluster  in  the
hierarchic and differential patterns that are dear to Structuralist semantics: havens of
(local and provisional) Order carved out of the garble of the Global Encyclopaedia. 
 
4. Immanence and Interpretability
23 By grafting the Peircean Interpretant onto structuralist componential analysis Eco tries,
as it were, to introduce a Carbon-based molecule in the inorganic chemistry of sememes.
His revised semantic model (1976: 105-20) overcomes some of the aporias of componential
analysis  through  the  introduction  of  contextual  and  circumstantial  selections  that
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register the Interpretants most frequently associated to each specific sign, be it a word,
an image, a gesture, or any other. Given the indefinitely open array of effects that a word
such as fisherman could produce when inserted in specific communicative contexts, and
granted that some contexts are more selective than others, any average English speaker
is expected to know that normally this Content Unit is associated to a range of probable
discourse  situations;  namely,  discourses  having  to  do  with  recreational or  commercial
fishing,  angling or trawling,  etc.,  where each contextual  selection triggers some of  the
possible  fisherman Interpretants  while  it  narcotizes  other  less  relevant  ones.  But  the
choice of which Interpretants are to be considered relevant is not entirely up to the
speakers or the listeners of every single utterance. An overall  Encyclopaedic network
regulates the different sense-paths that may branch off the common sememe they all
derive from. 
24 Hence the idea that a sememe is in itself an embryonic text. You just have to pronounce
the word fisherman (or draw a picture of a fisherman, or mime the act of fishing…) to
evoke a certain number of  situations where,  on the basis of  previous communicative
experiences, members of your semiotic community are most likely to expect such a sign
mentioned.  Your  mental  associations  may be  idiosyncratic  and autobiographical,  but
even  the  more  personal  synapses  are  largely  influenced  by  culturally  acquired
interpretive habits  (I,  for instance,  am inclined to link the word to Pinocchio’s  Green
Fisherman as well as to the lyrics of Paul Simon’s Lincoln Duncan, but I don’t expect you to
do the same). The point is: are these habits already embedded or condensed in the Sign as
such, as in a pre-Big Bang situation? Or would it be more appropriate to represent the
expanding sememe as a public repertoire of interpretations that come and go according
to the various uses people make of them? What, for example, happens to the sememe
fisherman when Jesus calls his apostles to be fishers of men, the brothers Grimm publish
the popular  tale  of  the  Fisherman and his  Greedy Wife  and a  XIXth century English
chemist invents a popular brand of candies he calls Fisherman’s Friends? These are all
Interpretants  of  the  same sign  and, sure,  they  all  exploit  some of  the  Interpretants
previously attributed to fisherman to create new semantic amalgams that, in turn, are
registered by the Encyclopaedia and may thus affect further interpretations. But how
correct  is  it  to consider such creative expansions as  part  of  the sememe’s structural
matrix, rather than as something that just happened to it under certain unpredictable
circumstances? The difference between the revised semantic model (still rooted in the
Structuralist tradition) and the cognitively inspired Q-model lies precisely in this: as Eco
opens up to interpretive semiotics,  the short-circuits  between different  nodes of  the
Global Semantic Space become ever more erratic and the spectrum of possible textual
expansions of each sememe seems to explode in all directions. 
25 Allowing that  the  Global  Encyclopaedia  is  a  semiotic  postulate  that  may  never  be
described in its complex totality Eco does not, however, give up on the structural analysis
of at least local portions of the Encyclopaedia. In The Role of the Reader he spells out the
concept that his previous essays only hinted at: the meaning of a sign – or a text – resides
in  the  indefinitely  expandable  sum  total  of  the  effects  (or  Interpretants)  the  sign
produces or may potentially produce in someone, and therefore in the open series of its
possible interpretations. This is an explicit reformulation of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim,
and it apparently transfers the responsibility of meaning construction from the sign as
such to the interpreters’ activities: whatever people do with a word, a sentence, an image,
a gesture, etc., the sum total of their sign-driven actions constitutes the meaning of that
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sign. Yet according to Eco there have to be ways to (a) predict the spectrum of activities
that  a  sign  may  produce  on  its  interpreters;  (b)  distinguish  between  relevant  and
irrelevant interpretive activities,  i.e.  between interpretations that  deserve to be (and
indeed  stand  a  chance  to  be)  included  in  the  sign’s  expanding  meaning  and  totally
idiosyncratic uses that have little or nothing to do with or to add to that public meaning.
That is why in the Italian version of The Role of the Reader (Lector in fabula, 1979a) he makes
a distinction between first- and second-generation textual theories. The former deny the
possibility of “disambiguating” a sign or a text independently from the effective situation
in which it is delivered and/or received and, consequently, they deny the legitimacy of
any  attempt  to  study  language  as  a  structural  system  that  precedes  its  discursive
actualizations. Instead, second-generation theories try to achieve “a wise amalgamation
between the two possibilities [thus establishing] points of contact between the study of
language as a structured system [and the study] of speeches or texts as products of a
language that was or is currently spoken” (Eco 1979a: 13; my translation). 
26 As usual, Eco’s puzzle is how to put together pieces taken from different and seemingly
incompatible sets. The key he picks to try to unlock the conundrum is the idea that “a
sememe is in itself an inchoative text and a text is an expanded sememe.” In Eco’s words,
it is “the Cardanic joint that can unite the semiotics of a code to the semiotics of texts and
speeches” (Eco 1979b: 49). 
27 Derived from Peirce, this concept primarily refers to the pragmatist maxim according to
which “to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what
practical consequences might result from the truth of that conception – and the sum of
these consequences constitute the entire meaning of the conception” (Peirce 1905, CP
5.9). In other words, the many lines of conduct that may conceivably arise from the fact of
having grasped an idea make up the meaning of the corresponding sign: see, for example,
the  meaning  of  Lithium,  which  Peirce  identifies  with  all  the  chemical  reactions  that
scientists may produce in a laboratory in reference to that substance they call Lithium. In
this light,  the meaning of a term includes the indefinite number of propositions that
could legitimately contain such term, along with the indefinite number of synapses the
term  and  its  expanded  propositions  could  trigger,  and  the  indefinite  number  of
behavioural responses they could elicit. Not just now, but in any conceivable future: a
very  hazardous  concept,  if  you  consider  it  from a  nominalistic  perspective,  since  it
implies that, over and beyond the arbitrary nature of linguistic signs, there lies some
unattainable yet efficient regularity of nature that assures the continuity of each chain of
Interpretants.
28 But Peirce is not the only author Eco is thinking about when he formulates his maxim.
The other explicit  reference is to Greimas (1973:  174),  quoted by Eco right before he
brings Peirce into play: “As Greimas asserted, a given semantic unit such as ‘fisherman’
carries a potential narrative program in its sememic structure: ‘the fisherman [intended
as a thematic role] holds within it, evidently, all the possibilities of its doing, all that one
can expect from it in terms of behaviour’.” (Eco 1979a: 19; my translation). 
29 Whether Peirce and Greimas are pointing to roughly the same concept is by no means
evident. One the one hand there seems to be an unexpected family resemblance between
the  two  (another  bisociated  link?).  Could  the  common  denominator  be  rooted  in  a
profound  logical  and/or  grammatical  intuition  that  overcomes  the  obvious  division
between Peirce’s interpretive realism and Greimas’s methodical constructivism? This is
Eco’s bet. The key to virtual sememe expansions is hidden somewhere between Peirce’s
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“Logic of Relatives” and Tesnières’s “Dependency Grammar” (which inspired Greimas’s
“Actantial  Structure”),  and  possibly  much  further  back  to  Francis  Lodwick’s  XVIIth
century attempt to break down the (allegedly universal) content of verbs such as to fish to
the frames of action they imply.10 What do these disparate theories have in common? The
idea that a single semiotic element possesses valencies or empty slots that predispose it
to form certain types of conjunctions with other elements; that, according to the types of
bonds it is capable of forming with other elements, it may unfold one or more predictable
lines or patterns of action: the skeleton of a story or,  rather,  of a range of potential
stories; and that these proto-stories are somehow outlined in the sign itself, in a way
analogous to the indefinite number of life forms made possible by a given genetic code. A
sort of Aristotelean entelechy drives each sign towards its self-fulfilling actualizations, as
though  the  sign’s  interpreters  were  but  the  contingent  agents  of  an  inbuilt
transformative process, “from being in posse or in germ” (Peirce, Century Dictionary, 1889:
“Entelechy”) to its actual forms of existence, partial and imperfect as these may be.
30 On the other hand, however, it is clear that Greimas and Peirce are considering different
aspects  of  the  semiotic  phenomenon.  In  line  with  the  Hjelmslevian  principle  of
Immanence (a sign system may be theorized as a purely linguistic, self-subsistent entity),
Greimas refers to a specific, synchronic state of language within whose closed structure
the item fisherman (itself a bundle of coordinated semantic traits) may be combined with a
great variety – but not all – other lexemes to form a vast array of possible narrative
syntagms. There are many things the semantic system allows a fisherman to do, including
swimming, drowning, drinking, singing, dancing, belching and sleeping… – but not flying.
Not  because  (fisher)men  are  empirically  unable  to  fly  (a  fact  that  is  linguistically
irrelevant), but because the system of the English language does not contemplate this
combinatory option. According to Greimas, the range of possible textual expansions is
pre-determined by the affordances of the lexeme’s narrative grammar. And even when –
as in Jesus’ fishers of men – the word is used metaphorically to mean something that is
literally incongruous, the figure of speech is made possible by the linguistic compatibility
between the deep semantic structure of the metaphorical vehicle and that of its tenor (
hunters of men would not have done the job). 
31 Instead,  Peirce’s  pragmatic  maxim  (hinged  on  the  principle  of  Interpretability)  has
nothing to do with the grammar of  a particular state of  language:  his  conception of
meaning is  that  of  a  dynamic and ongoing process  whose only limits  are set  by the
constrictions  of  logic  and  of  reality.  The  strings  of  Interpretants  that  make  up  the
meaning of a word may escape in n directions, according to the more or less adventurous
paths  followed  by  members  of  the  community  of  interpreters,  and  the  possible
expansions of the concept of fisherman (or fish, or water…) are not established in advance
by  the  rules  of  a  nomothetic  institution.  Rather,  a  process  of  natural  (or  cultural?)
selection picks out those Interpretants whose consequences yield the most beneficial
effects, i. e. the ones that are most liable to turn the world into a more predictable or
liveable or manageable environment, i.e. (from Peirce’s scientific perspective) the ones
that in the long run prove to be truer, or at least less false than others. 
 
5. Possible and Impossible
32 What does Eco have in mind when he says that “a sememe is a virtual/inchoative text”?
That sense is tightly packed within the narrative, discursive and grammatical structures
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of a coded unit (such as Greimas’s thematic role: the fisherman as a matrix of possible
stories), regardless of whether the sense-paths the code virtually contains are effectively
actualized in the course of semiosis? Or that semiosis is born free and then restrained by
the Noes of experience which determine the sum of “practical consequences [that] might
result from the truth of that conception”? It is impossible to decide. All the more so if we
extend the scale of Eco’s principle from the textual expansions of a single sememe (the
number  of  sentences  that  could  contain  the  term  fisherman)  to  the  possible
interpretations of a single text (the number of ways one could read Moby Dick). Sometimes
Eco leans towards the structuralist option, as when – in order to defend the “rights of the
text” against the uncontrolled intentions of its deconstructive readers (Eco 1990) – he
outlines  the  concept  of  intentio  operis (that  which  the  text  “intends”  to  say)  as  the
structural  matrix  capable  of generating  all  possible  interpretations.  Other  times  he
favours the pragmatist approach, as when he defines the same intentio operis in negative
terms (much like Peirce describes our inferential relation with reality) as something that
manifests itself indirectly whenever a particular reading collides with the literal evidence
which may be drawn from the text.11 
33 Both solutions are per se insufficient for the purposes of the encyclopaedic-inferential
theory pursued by Eco. Greimas’s thematic role is not designed to explain what happens
when someone interprets a text.12 But Peirce’s pragmatic maxim does not describe the
culturally determined structures within and against which most communicative acts are
performed. Yet neither aspect may be overlooked by a theory that aims at accounting for
what actually happens when someone tries to make sense of the world (and the texts that
inhabit it) through the specific cultural filters that regulate her system of expectations, as
well as through the cognitive procedures that make any interpretation possible. 
34 “How is it possible for the two points of view to coexist?,” asks Eco (1999: 251) almost a
quarter of a century after A Theory of Semiotics. Still grappling with the question that set
off his semiotic inquiry, the answer he arrives at in Kant and the Platypus is anything but
conclusive.
The result  of  the  preceding  reflections  is  that  they  must coexist,  because  if  we
choose one of them only, we cannot account for our way of knowing and expressing
what  we know.  It  is  indispensable  to  make them coexist  on a  theoretical  level,
because, effectively speaking, on the level of our cognitive experiences we proceed
so that we run – if the expression does not seem to reductive – with the hare and
hunt  with  the  hounds.  The  unstable  equilibrium  of  this  coexistence  is  not
(theoretically)  syncretistic,  because  it  is  on  the  basis  of  this  happily  unstable
equilibrium that our understanding proceeds. […] In the process of understanding,
the structural moment and the interpretative moment alternate and complement
each other step by step. (Eco 1999: 251-3; original emphasis)
35 Eco’s argument may at first seem circular: the two points of view coexist because they have to
(cf.  “Why is there Being rather than nothing? Because there is,” Eco 1999: 17;  original
emphasis). Is this a case of what Peirce (CP 5.382-3) would call a priori reasoning? Perhaps.
But Peirce also says that when science fails, the a priori method is the next best option,
“since it is then the expression of instinct which must be the ultimate cause of belief in all
cases” (CP 5.383). In want of a better explanation, Eco follows the instinct telling him that
order and adventure (cf. Paolucci 2017), categorization and observation, recognition and
invention,  and all  the other bisociated matrices we have discussed in this article are
complementary opposites referring to the two forces that, together, drive all semiotic
activity.  Rather  than  considering  the  duck/rabbit  (now  hound/hare)  effect  as  an
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undesirable outcome of  his  theory,  he reframes it  as  the ultimate object  of  semiotic
investigation. If the theory oscillates from one perspective to the other without reaching
a satisfactory synthesis, it is because that “happily unstable equilibrium” is the proprium
of human understanding. 
36 But if bisociation is within semiosis itself, engrained in our way of making sense of things,
then  any  attempt  at  theorizing  it  in  a  scientifically  consistent  way  (rather  than
maintaining it in a state of humorous suspension) meets the obvious hitch of being itself a
semiotic  activity,  based  on  the  same self-contradictory  logic  it  is  trying  to  grasp.  A
bisociated  mind  trying  to  make  sense  of  its  being  bisociated  is  reminiscent  of  the
paradoxical situation, described by Eco (1999: 320-1), of a third prosthetic eye attached to
the tip of the index finger and pointed towards the other two. What would one see? The
mind boggles. “Would we see the index finger with the eyes in our head, or the eyes in
our head with the index finger? Once more, either we go by zones of focus (we imagine,
alternately closing the eyes in our head and the eye in our finger) or we slip in complete
imaginative confusion.”13 
 
Figure 3: Penrose’s Devil Fork/Impossible Trident
37 Notice how this hypothetical solution – the alternation between two self-consistent yet
reciprocally incompatible visions – is in turn akin to the way Eco (1994: 100 and 1999: 318)
defines the concept of possible impossible worlds. With reference to Penrose’s trident
(analysed by Merrell 1981), he observes that, whereas the overall two-dimensional figure
describes an impossible three-dimensional whole object, each partial 3-D object that may
be conjured up by covering one of the two sides of the dotted line is in fact in itself
possible.  The  intermediate area  is  compatible  with  both  –  hence  its  ambiguity.  Like
Koestler’s bisociated matrixes, the two possible partial objects become impossible only
when merged into one. 
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38 But impossible with respect to what logic? The question will not go away. Maybe such an
object  could exist  in some different  world,  and it  is  only because of  our intellectual
incapacities that – so far – we have been unable to conceive it. The perverse pleasure that
we take in analysing the self-voiding logic of such possible impossible worlds is that of
our cognitive defeat.  A defeat  that  keeps challenging our scientific  imagination:  who
knows, one day we might be able to “redesign our brain” (Eco 1999: 427) in order to solve
the overall puzzle. In the meantime all we can do is to keep trying with the one we have.
“Therefore I hold that when we refer to inconceivable entities, we behave as if, on being
faced with our ‘white box,’ we were to peep into it by alternately lifting opposite sides of
the lid for a few millimetres.” (Eco 1999: 321). Is this a description of what Eco’s structural
pragmatics does with the possible impossible object that is semiosis? 
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NOTES
1. “When two independent matrices of perception or reasoning interact with each other the
result […] is either a collision ending in laughter, or their fusion in a new intellectual synthesis, or
their confrontation in an aesthetic experience. The bisociative patterns found in any domain of
creative activity are tri-valent: that is to say, the same pair of matrices can produce comic, tragic,
or intellectually challenging effects.” (Koestler 1964: 45; original emphasis).
2. “I propose to define as a sign everything that, on the grounds of a previously established social
convention,  can  be  taken  as  something  standing  for  something  else.”  (Eco  1976:  16;  original
emphasis).
3. “A general semiotic theory will be considered powerful according to its capacity for offering
an appropriate formal definition for every sort of sign-function, whether it  has already been
described and coded or  not.  So the typology of  modes of  sign-production aims at  proposing
categories able to describe even those as yet uncoded sign-functions conventionally posited in
the very moment in which they appear for the first time.” (Eco 1976: 5).
4. Cf. Eco 1983 and 1986 on undercoded and overcoded abductions.
5. See Eco 1976 on the different modes of Sign-production.
6. Whether the words of a language are the outcome of a process of standardization or of a
stipulated convention is not a problem that Eco dwells on extensively, in accordance with the
1866  linguistic  ban  on  the  discussions  regarding  the  origins  of  language.  However,  he  does
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occasionally seem to slant towards the first hypothesis, for example when – in the last page of
The Search of the Perfect Language (1997) – he mentions Ibn Hazm’s argument against the idea that
different languages were born from convention: “if so, people would have to have had a prior
language in which they could agree about conventions.” Notice the similarity between this Xth
century  objection  and  Quine’s  1969  “vicious  regress”  argument  in  his  forward  to  Lewis’
Convention, p. xi. The difference, of course, is that Ibn Hazm believed that historical languages
derived from an original language which included all the others.
7. See Eco 1976 on contextual and circumstantial selections.
8. “Inferential processes (mainly under the form of Peircean abduction) stand at the basis of
every semiotic phenomenon.” (Eco 1986: 8).
9. On the combinatory logic of cultural innovation see also Eco 2004. 
10. See Eco 1997 on the search for the perfect language.
11. On the ambiguities of the concept of intentio operis, see Pisanty 2015.
12. Regarding this point, cf. Violi 2017: “The very idea of the sememe as a virtual text is quite
close to Greimas’s thematic roles.  But there is a key difference.  Simplifying substantially,  we
could say that Greimas’s theory is a theory about how text is structured, while Eco’s is a theory of
knowledge and interpretation. More precisely, Eco’s is a theory about how our general cultural
knowledge is organized and how we use it in order to interpret the world and the various texts
that inhabit it.”
13. Regarding the same puzzle, Eco (1999: 427) also writes: “It would seem difficult to handle two
images at the same time; perhaps it would be necessary to close the two normal eyes when the
third is in use, but I’m not sure this would be enough. The most reasonable conclusion is that the
innovation would make it necessary to redesign our brain.”
ABSTRACTS
In this paper I will discuss the extent to which Umberto Eco’s Semiotics maintains the unstable
and oscillatory equilibrium between conflicting matrices that is proper to humorous thinking
and ambiguous figures such as the famous duck-rabbit illusion and Penrose’s impossible trident.
To do so I shall summon the concept of bisociation (Koestler 1964): though never an item of Eco’s
own philosophical toolbox, bisociation plays an important role in the creation of some of Eco’s
most innovative theoretical contributions, insofar as they result from a possible/impossible graft
between Structuralism and Pragmatism.  For  each,  the  question will  be  whether  the  implant
produces  self-consistent  theoretical  amalgams,  or  whether  some  degree  of  contradiction
inevitably remains to generate the abovementioned duck-rabbit effect. I shall then analyse the
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